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Abstract 
This study investigated the effect of financial literacy on willingness to pay for 
micro-insurance among informal commercial market business operators in 
Ghana. Heckman’s Two-Step Estimation Technique is used to examine data on 
612 informal commercial market business operators from selected major urban 
market centres in Ghana. The results indicate that financial literacy increases the 
amount willing to pay for micro-insurance. Other determinants of willingness to 
pay for micro-insurance include marital status, dependents, savings, trust, 
premium payment mode and income. The study recommends that microfinance 
institutions should strengthen financial education to increase the uptake of micro-
insurance. 
Keywords: Financial literacy; Willingness to pay; Microfinance; Micro-
insurance; commercial market business operators, Ghana 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has assumed a significant role in delivering banking and allied 
financial services and deepening financial inclusion, especially offering open 
access to credit and savings mobilization at an affordable cost to the financially 
excluded. Through microfinance many poor households have one business or the 
other. However, poor households operate informally, have their livelihoods 
dependent on self-employed ventures, and they are exposed to countless risks. To 
cope with risks and shocks the vulnerable informal sector operator has a range of 
informal coping mechanisms; mainly family supports, borrow from friends, rely 
on limited savings, and at worse sell an asset. According to Siegel et al. (2001), 
these informal risk-pooling schemes relied on by the vulnerable to cope with 
shocks, however, offer limited protection, often not readily available to depend on 
and, are prone to fail during emergencies. 
It, therefore, appears that the reliable buffer for poor victims of livelihood shocks 
may find meaning in an affordable insurance scheme. Micro-insurance is hailed as 
an important tool for risk management, social protection and fighting poverty that 
emanate from shocks and a plethora of studies attest to this (Janzen and Carter, 
2013; Kishor, 2013; Mukhtar, 2013; Akter, 2012; Parvathi, 2012; Hoefer & 
Midgley, 2012). It has however, been argued that insurance is not always 
accessible and affordable to everyone and it remains the preserve of the regular 
income earners and the wealthy excluding the poor small businesses and irregular 
wage earners (Farooqui, 2013). Among the various reasons cited for this sad 
spectacle are that the small business owners in most cases, do not only lack the 
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ability to pay out-of-pocket costs for insurance but also lack the knowledge and/or 
financial literacy necessary to adopt and utilize financial products, particularly 
micro-insurance ( Donfoute and Makaudze, 2011). 
Financial literacy is the ability to analyze financial information, manage and 
communicate about personal financial decisions so as to impact one’s material 
well-being (Abreu and Mends, 2010). Thus, financial literacy influences one’s 
ability to process economic information about financial matters and make 
informed decision (Mahdzan and Tabiani, 2013). The literature confirms that 
there is strong link between financial literacy, use of financial services and 
consumer welfare (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Gine, Townsend and Vickery, 
2008; Cole, Sampson and Zia, 2009). Other studies claim that individuals and 
households with limited knowledge of the features of contemporary financial 
services tend to have poor financial planning and subsequently poor financial 
decision making (Stango and Zinman, 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Low 
financial literacy has also been found to lead to poor risk diversification, 
inefficient portfolio allocations and poor use of financial services (Japelli and 
Padula, 2011). 
The literature further indicates that besides being financially literate, a person 
must be willing to pay for micro-insurance to make it successful (Aidoo et al., 
2014). Akter (2012) maintains that the success story of micro-insurance in 
reducing livelihood vulnerabilities hinges on the target population’s willingness 
and ability to pay the true cost of the insurance scheme. Willingness to pay for 
micro-insurance can be envisioned as two-step process; the decision of whether or 
4 
 
not to participate in micro-insurance; once a decision is made to participate in 
micro-insurance, the next step is to decide how much to pay.  In as much as this 
argument sounds plausible, it is, however, imperative to acknowledge that target 
clients knowledge about the features of a particular insurance scheme plays 
significant role in convincing a potential insuring person to subscribe to 
insurance.  
Theoretically, willingness to pay for a product or service is rooted in demand 
theory. As conceptualized by Ahlersten (2008), demand is not only concerned 
about actualization of consumption decision, but about what one is capable and 
willing to pay for a product at a particular time. In furtherance to this argument, 
the economic theory of compensating valuation subscribed to by Varian (2009), 
view willingness to pay as the measure of the amount that must be taken away 
from a person’s income while keeping his utility constant. Thus, to ascertain 
effective demand for a product or service it is imperative to be well informed 
about the true price at which many consumers will be willing to patronize the 
product. 
Even though a strong link has been established among financial literacy, 
willingness to pay and uptake of micro-insurance in both the theoretical and 
empirical literature (Akter, 2012; Kuwawenarua et al., 2011 Falola et al. 2013; 
Khan and Ahmed, 2013; Danso-Abbeam et al. 2014), empirical research linking  
These three variables  in the informal commercial market business sector that has 
a low uptake of insurance  but has suffered a number of fire outbreaks in recent 
times in Ghana has remained largely unexplored. The objective of this study, 
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therefore, is to examine the effect of financial literacy on willingness to pay for 
micro-insurance among informal commercial market business operators in Ghana. 
The results of the study show that financial literacy, marital status, number of 
dependents, savings, trust, premium payment mode and income influence 
willingness to pay for micro-insurance in Ghana. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: section two provides a review of related literature; the data 
and methodology are presented in section three; section four deals with the results 
and discussion, and conclusions and policy recommendations are delivered in 
section five. 
2. Literature Review: the market for micro-insurance 
Theoretical Literature 
Micro-insurance has been hailed by many (Holzmann, Sherbune and Tesliuc, 
2003; Adjei, Arun and Hossain, 2009) as a new revolution in microfinance for 
risk management, social protection and poverty reduction. Micro-insurance as a 
facet of microfinance stands as a bridge to halt the impoverishment that forces the 
vulnerable to sell assets, deplete hard worn savings due to liquidity constraint, 
partly fill the deficit gap of public social security schemes, strengthen productive 
capacity and expand economic opportunities to vulnerable groups (Tabea, 2010; 
Fletschner and Kenney, 2011). It is argued that sinking into poverty cannot be 
equated to lack of income but timely intervention of income at the time it is most 
needed (Bateman, 2010). Thus, the potential welfare enhancing of any micro-
insurance service lies in the ability to offer improvement in the welfare of the 
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vulnerable. Though considerable literature points to the fact that micro-insurance 
has the potential to mitigate and restore the victims of unexpected business shock 
to the state in which they were (Boltzen and Van Den Bergh, 2011; Bendig and 
Arun, 2011; Brown and Churchill, 1999), scores of literature still hold contrary 
views on underpinning factors behind micro-insurance patronage (Browne and 
Hoyt, 2000; Chowdhury et al., 2007; Kjosevski, 2012). Thus, this section reviews 
theoretical and empirical literature on the link between financial literacy and 
willingness to pay for micro-insurance scheme. 
Theoretically, some early development economists emphasized the relationship 
between material progress and the state of the financial markets (Kuznet, 1966; 
Gurley and Shaw, 1967; Mckinnon and Goldsmith, 1973).  These early 
economists supported the argument for the removal of financial market 
imperfections, which impede rapid progress. Merton (1989) emphasizes the 
investigation into the micro behaviour of agents in the inter-temporal deployment 
of their resources in an environment of uncertainty. This thought presumes that 
economic organizations exist to facilitate resource allocation function to fulfill 
their risk-pooling and risk-sharing roles of financial intermediation to promote 
insurance take-up at minimum cost. In furtherance to this, Khan (2008) argues 
that the reluctance of commercial financial intermediaries to extend micro-
insurance services to the poor is underpinned by financial illiteracy. Continuing 
the debate on the role financial intermediaries in removal of information 
asymmetry, Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) assume strong connection between 
financial intermediation and removal of information asymmetry. Thus, 
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theoretically, financial institutions through financial literacy arise to mitigate the 
impact of information asymmetry, which impedes financial market awareness. 
The reason is, as financial knowledge increases, individuals become conscious 
and familiar with the financial system and begin to express willingness to 
participate in the financial market. This supports the argument that financially 
unsophisticated individuals have a huge responsibility to make sensible and 
accurate financial investment decisions such as borrowing, investing, saving and 
insurance (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). 
 This presupposes that based on human expectations about future uncertainty, 
fully rational and well-informed individuals will tend to consume less than his or 
her earnings in order to save to smoothing future consumption shortfalls. 
Following this assumption, the individual’s portfolio allocation decision is posited 
to hinge on arrangement of optimal savings and decumulation of savings to 
smooth marginal utility over his or her lifetime (Friedman, 1957). This life cycle 
optimization behaviour is posited to be influenced by preference, liquidity 
constraint and social safety net benefits.  However, the decision to utilize financial 
product is underpinned by understanding financial market information. Thus the 
desire to patronize financial service cannot be actualized due to market 
imperfection emanating from information asymmetry (Hastings and Tejeda-
Ashton, 2008) 
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Empirical Literature 
Empirically, Kuwawenaruwa et al. (2011) used cross-sectional survey data drawn 
from 2224 households in Tanzania and found that gender, area of residence, levels 
of income, formal education and religion had significant influence on willingness 
to pay for micro-insurance. The authors, however, found no relationship between 
financial literacy and willingness to pay for micro-insurance. In a related study, 
Babatunde et al. (2012) employed data on 360 household heads in Nigeria to 
study willingness to pay for micro-insurance. Though the study concludes that 
financial education could improve willingness to participate in micro-insurance, 
the link between financial literacy education and willingness to pay for micro-
insurance was not clear.  
In a similar study, Falola et al. (2013) investigated the determinants of willingness 
to pay for cocoa farmers’ micro-insurance in Nigeria. Using primary data drawn 
on 120 farmers and the probit regression, the results showed that age of a 
household head, educational level and farm income significantly influence 
willingness to pay for micro-insurance scheme. Though the study concludes 
further that level of awareness and financial information underpin willingness to 
pay for micro-insurance, the downside of this conclusion is found in the failure to 
analyze the possible impact of financial literacy intervention as a conduit for 
financial information assimilation and hence the decision to participate in micro-
insurance. 
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In furtherance to this, Khan and Ahmed (2013) points to literacy – gap or lack of 
knowledge as important potential barrier to insurance market participation. Using 
quasi experimental study design, they assessed the impact of educational 
intervention on willingness to pay for micro-insurance in Bangladesh. A major 
conclusion from their study hinged on the fact that educational intervention which 
improves financial literacy could impact on insurance decision and willingness to 
pay for micro-insurance. However, the extent to which financial literacy impacts 
willingness to patronize micro-insurance was not clear from their study. Danso-
Abbeam et al. (2014) analyzed the determinants of willingness to pay for farm 
micro-insurance by small holder cocoa farmers using cross-sectional data 
involving 201 respondents in Ghana. The study found premium amount willing to 
pay to be influenced by marital status, educational attainment, ownership of farm 
land, farmers’ awareness and income. They suggest that awareness creation 
through financial literacy will impact significantly on micro-insurance 
intervention programme. However, failure to account for distinct impact of 
financial literacy on amount willing to pay for micro-insurance blurs the beauty of 
this conclusion. 
Becchetti et al. (2013) examined the link between financial literacy and 
participation in the financial market using experimental design involving 944 
respondents in Italy. They found financial education as major predictor of 
financial market participation. However, the studies failed to empirically 
investigate the nature of the link between financial literacy and willingness to 
participate in insurance market. Narges and Laily (2011) examined the 
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determinants of financial wellness of 2000 respondents in Malaysia. They found 
financial literacy significant in explaining participation in the financial market and 
financial wellness. The study further concludes that financial education should 
occupy the top most position of policy intervention to improve participation and 
utilization of financial services. However, the link between financial literacy and 
micro-insurance market participation was not empirically examined. This study 
will investigate the effect of financial literacy on the willingness of commercial 
market business operators to take up micro-insurance. 
3. Data and Method  
The study employed cross-sectional study design. The data was elicited from 612 
informal commercial market business operators in six selected urban commercial 
market centres in northern, central and coastal Ghana through in-person face-to-
face interview. The data collection exercise began in early June, 2014 and ended 
in the last week of August, 2014. The survey data contains information on 
features such as the demographics, willingness to participate in micro-insurance 
number of years in business, income levels, access to credit, financial knowledge 
of the respondent, trust in insurance as risk management tool and ownership of 
savings. 
3.1. Target Population and Sampling Frame 
The study targeted the economically active informal commercial market business 
operators who conduct daily trading activities in the markets centres.  The 
justification for the concentration on informal commercial market business 
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operators emanates from the fact that, this group who conduct daily commercial 
activities in these market centres is relatively more susceptible to hazards, because 
most of them have their business assets permanently situated in the markets. 
Moreover, this target group is easily accessible for purposes of information 
gathering. The study employed multi-stage cluster sampling technique. First the 
study areas were segmented into three main zones (clusters): northern cluster, 
central cluster and coastal cluster. Second, two (2) market centres were selected 
from each cluster based on number of vibrant markets centres in each cluster. The 
study selected only vibrant urban market centres where predominantly market 
participants had their business assets permanently situated. Based on this 
criterion, each cluster was identified with four (4) main major market centres. 
Then, two (2) most relatively vibrant markets were selected from each zone 
(cluster). The respondents were selected by convenience from the market centres. 
The total sample size used in this study was determined by simplified statistical 
formula suggested by Magnani (1997) and Godden (2004). (See appendix). 
3.2. Model Specification and Estimation Technique 
Given the potential selection bias, which occurs out of estimating the effect of 
financial literacy on amount willing to pay for financial literacy, it is conceivable 
that after controlling for the regressors, those respondents with positive 
willingness to pay a given amount to participate in micro-insurance programme 
are not randomly selected from the population. This is so because individuals self-
select to participate or not to participate in micro-insurance programme. This 
imposes a potential restriction on the model. The implication, therefore, is that the 
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resultant Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates suffer from selection bias. 
Accordingly, a selection model is required to take care of the possible bias by 
allowing for possible dependence in the two parts of the model. To deal with the 
problem of selection bias, this study employed Heckman’s Two-Step estimation 
technique, which caters for selection bias.  
The equation for amount willing to pay was specified as: 
                                                                          (1) 
Where;   is amount willing to pay for micro-insurance, δ is financial 
literacy index,  is premium,  is set of socio-demographic characteristics and  
is income.  
Let η  and writing (1) in explicit form; 
Thus:  = β1+β2ʹη+μ                                                                    (2)                                      
Where,  is already defined, βi are parameters to be estimated, η is 
vector of explanatory variables μ is the error term. 
From here, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model could be estimated. However, 
such estimation suffers from sample selection bias. This emanates from the fact 
that individuals self-select to participate in micro-insurance or not. Thus the 
expected amount willing to pay for micro-insurance for those who are willing to 
pay certain amount to participate in micro-insurance is given by the joint density 
bivariate normally distributed variables as expressed by the form:  
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                                 (3) 
Where,  and  are the probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions of the standard normal distribution. The estimate of the ratio of  and 
 represents the inverse mills ratio (IMR) or the control function, denoted as 
lambda  which usually takes care of possible selection bias.  
 Similarly the conditional expectation of the amount willing to pay for those who 
will not participate in micro-insurance scheme is also expressed as: 
                            (4) 
From these joint conditional expectation expressions, the direction of  
that is, if the estimate of  is positive (negative), is an indication of whether the 
OLS method is bias upwards (downwards). However, the IMR corrects for any 
potential bias in the OLS estimates. Therefore, the sign and the significance of 
the   estimate give an idea of existence of any selection bias.  
3.3 The Empirical Model 
The Heckman’s two-step technique involves selection model and the model of 
interest (the outcome model). Given the fact that selection model is required to 
take care of the possible bias by allowing for possible dependence in the two 
parts of the empirical model, joint estimation of the following selection and 
outcome empirical models were considered: 
=β0+β1Sexi+β2 Agei+β3 Mari_Stati+β4 Market Levyi 
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+β5Fin_Liti+β6Dependti+β7Years_Bizi+β8Savingsi+β9Trusti+β10Premiumi 
+β11Creditaccessri+β12Peeri +β13Riskexper+β14Incomei + εi                   (5) 
Where, peer influence (Peer) and risk experienced (Riskexper) are exclusive 
restriction variables, other explanatory variable include sex, Age, marital status 
(Mari_Stat), market levy, Financial literacy (Fin_Lit), mode of premium payment 
(premium), access to credit (creditaccess), and income of a respondent. To ensure 
robust identification and estimates in empirical practice, it is appropriate that 
exclusive restriction is imposed. In this regard, the selection model captured as 
equation (5), should be inclusive of exogenous variable(s) that is excluded from 
the outcome model also captured as equation (6).  Equation (5) is a specification 
of a probit model, which predicts the probability that an individual will 
participate in micro-insurance scheme. The outcome equation of interest is 
therefore, specified as follows: 
AmtWilling = β0+β1Sexi+β2Agei+β3Mari_Stati+β4MarketLevyi 
                  +β5Fin_Liti+β6Dependi+β7Years_BiZi+β8Savingsi+β9Trusti 
                +β10Premiumi +β11Creditaccessi+β12Incomei+μi                                         (6)      
 
The descriptions and measurement of the variables included in the models have 
been explained in the appendix A to this work. 
 
The Construction of the Financial Literacy Index 
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The financial literacy variable  captured information on selected 
economic and financial concepts applicable to individual’s day-to-day financial 
decision making and future portfolio allocation decision. Thus, knowledge and 
understanding about economic and financial concepts such as inflation, money 
transfer, budget, interest on loan, microcredit, “susu”, mobile money, ATM, 
minimum balance, shares, cheque account, mortgage, insurance and e-zwich. The 
financial literacy index  was constructed as a function of specific 
underlying financial concept variables , such that  represents individual  
understanding or lack of understanding of concept variable . Therefore, our 
functional specification takes the form:  
                                                                                       (7)    
 The expanded form of the functional specification is then expressed as follows:  
+ …+                                                                       (8) 
Following the method employed by Burncrot et al. (2011), equal weights  
were assigned to each financial concept variable based on correct answers 
provided by the respondent on each of the financial concept.  The weights were 
assigned in such a way that a correct answer attracts one (1) and incorrect answer 
attracts zero (0). Thus an individual who answered all the fourteen financial 
concept correctly had an index of (14). Whereas, an individual who answered 
none of the fourteen questions incorrectly had an index of (0). Basically, the 
method gives equal weights to each financial literacy question. Thus the extended 
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form of the financial literacy index for the purpose of this study assumes the 
following form: 
+ …+ W                                                           (9) 
Where  represents composite index of financial literacy,  is 
corresponding weights assigned to the score of each concept variable  
4. Results and Discussion 
The results and discussion on the estimated Heckman’s Selection Model is 
presented in this section. Table 1 first describes the demographic characteristics of 
the respondents. 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of respondents 
Variable Description Observations Mean Std. Deviation 
Sex A female dummy (1/0) 612 0.392 0.488 
Age Number of years 612 38.058 11.559 
Mari_Status Current marital status: 612   
 Single 194 0.318 0.234 
 Married 334 0.545 0.498 
 Divorced 57 0.093 0.290 
 Widowed 27 0.044 0.205 
Depend Dependents 612 3.717 2.602 
Source: Field survey data, (2014) 
Table 1 presents a summary of demographic characteristics of the respondents 
engaged in this study. These include Sex, Age, marital status of the respondent 
and dependents under the care of the respondent. Sex is a female dummy, Age 
was used to capture the number of years of age of the respondent, and the mean 
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age is given as 38.058 or 38 years. Also, Mari_ Status denotes current marital 
status of the respondent. It is captured as a categorical variable, which include 
single, married, divorced and widowed. 194 of the respondents were single, 334 
were married, 57  had divorced and 27 were widows. The number of dependents 
under the care of the respondent is denoted by depend, with a mean number of 
approximately 4 dependents.  Table 2 presents results of the first stage regression, 
which predicts the probability of respondent’s willingness to participate in micro-
insurance scheme given the predictor variables. 
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Table 2: Results of Probit estimation (dependent variable: willingness to 
participate in micro-insurance) 
Variables Coefficient Std.errors 
Sex 0.179 0.146 
Age 0.009 0.008 
Mari_Status:     -     - 
Single 0.414 0.390 
Married 0.434 0.341 
Divorced 0234 0.378 
Market_Levy 0.002 0.008 
Fin_Lit 0.018 0.061 
Depend -0.052* 0.052 
Year-BiZ 0.006 0.009 
Savings 0.060 0.001 
Trust -0.368*** 0.138 
Premium:      -     - 
Yearly 0.080 0.384 
Half yearly 0.729 0.393 
Quarterly 0.545 0.362 
Monthly 0.545*** 0.253 
Creditaccess 0.385 0.140 
Peer 0.384** 0.180 
Riskexper 0.364*** 0.139 
Income 0.298 0.414 
Constant -0.362 0.719 
* = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
Note: Widowed and daily are used as reference categories for mari_status and 
premium. 
Source: Estimated from field survey data, (2014) 
 
The number of dependents under the care of a respondent (Depend) has a 
negative association with the probability of willingness to participate in micro-
insurance. The coefficient of -0.052 suggests that as the number of dependents 
under the care of the respondent increases the probability of expression 
willingness to participate in micro-insurance decreases. This is possible, because 
additional dependents increases the burden to take care of the additional member 
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and this makes a prospective insured less inclined to express willingness to 
participate in micro-insurance scheme. 
The coefficient of Trust is – 0.368, this means that trust in micro-insurance 
reduces the probability of willingness to participate in micro-insurance scheme. 
This could be so because peoples’ perception and confidence in insurance 
contract have eroded trust for financial contract like micro-insurance due to 
uncertainty in fulfilling contract terms (Yusuf et al., 2009). This makes potential 
insuring public less probable of participating in micro-insurance contract. 
Again, the coefficient 0.545 for Monthly premium payment mode category show 
positive association with probability of willingness to participate in micro-
insurance scheme. This implies that individuals are more probable of participating 
in micro-insurance when premium is paid monthly compared with their 
counterparts in daily payment mode category. This is plausible because the longer 
the premium collection period, the more flexible it is in enabling people to afford 
the regular premium payment obligation. This result suggests that the more 
flexible the premium payment is, the more people tend to be inclined in 
participating in micro-insurance. 
Similarly, the respondent’s risk experience (Riskexper) in business has a positive 
association with probability of willingness to participate in micro-insurance 
scheme. Given the coefficient of Riskexper as 0.364, then an increase in number 
of risks experienced in business increases the probability of willingness to 
participate in micro-insurance. A possible reason is that experiences with risk in 
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business have the tendency of influencing and appealing to one’s conscience and 
hence the inclination to offer to participate in micro-insurance scheme. This result 
confirms the finding of Schindler (2010). 
Again, peer influence (peer) is positively associated with the probability of 
willingness to participate in micro-insurance. This means that the number of 
business peers known to have insured their business assets increases with the 
probability of participating in micro-insurance. Thus as peer increases given the 
coefficient of 0.384, the probability of participating in micro-insurance also 
increases. One could be influenced by his or her business peers known to have 
insured their businesses.  The results of the outcome model of interest; which is 
an estimation of factors influencing amount willing to pay for micro-insurance is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results of Heckman estimation (dependent variable: amount willing 
to pay) 
    Variable Coefficient  Std. error 
Sex  0.095 0.084 
Age  0.010 0.500 
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Mari_status:      -   - 
Single  0.409*                 0.239              
       Married  0.473** 0.213 
Divorced  0.440*  0.244 
Market Levy -0.007 0.005 
Fin_Lit  0.026** 0.012 
Depend -0.060*            0.031   
Years_BiZ  0.003 0.005             
Savings  0.001* 0.006 
Trust -0.324* 0.190 
Premium:       -    -   
Yearly  0.471*** 0.146 
Half yearly  0.344* 0.195 
Quarterly  0.694*** 0.171 
Monthly  0.444*** 0.148 
Creditaccess -0.059 0.086 
Income 
Constant 
Lambda(mills)  
rho(ρ) 
sigma(  
WaldChi2(17) 
Observations 
             
 0.019* 
1.87*** 
-0.599* 
-0.708* 
 0.845  
60.64*** 
 601 
0.010 
0.436 
 0.305                
 
* = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
Source: Computed from field survey data, (2014) 
 
From Table 2 the log of amount willing to pay  is explained by 
marital status (Mari_Status), financial literacy (Fin_Lit), and number of 
dependents (Depend). Also  is explained by Savings, Trust, 
premium payment mode and income. Table 2 also shows that yearly, quarterly 
and monthly modes of premium payment for micro-insurance are statistically 
significant at 1% in influencing the amount a market operator is willing to pay for 
micro-insurance. Again, rho (ρ), which represents the correlation coefficient of ε 
and μ in equations (5) and (6) is also statistically significant at 10%. This is an 
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indication that selection bias existed in the data generation process and has been 
corrected. 
It can also be explained from Table 2 that marital status (Mari_Status) has 
significant influence on the amount a market operator is willing to pay for micro-
insurance. The coefficient of 0.409 shows that, being single increases the amount 
individuals are willing to pay for micro-insurance by 40.9% more compared to 
being a widowed. Again, the coefficient of  married of  0.473 shows that being a 
marriage person increases the amount market operators are willing to pay for 
micro-insurance by 47.3% more compared to being a widowed. Similarly, the 
coefficient of divorced of 0.440 indicates that being separated from marriage 
increases the amount that individuals are willing to pay for micro-insurance on the 
average by  44%  more  compared to their counterparts in the widowed category. 
The coefficient of financial literacy is 0.026, which is statistically significant at 
5%. This means that an increase in financial literacy or financial knowledge 
increases the amount willing to pay for micro-insurance among the informal 
commercial market business operators all other things being equal.  This is so 
because an improvement in one’s financial literacy serves as conduit for thorough 
understanding of financial concepts and financial services, which in turn impact 
significantly on personal financial decision making, management and financial 
well-being. Understanding the importance of financial products and basic 
knowledge of principles underlying financial service utilization can persuade the 
individual to have the willingness to spend extra money to patronize such 
financial service. The finding from this study is in agreement with the assertion by 
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Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and Lusardi (2008) and Khan and Ahmed (2013); 
that financial literacy-gap or lack of knowledge about certain basic financial 
concepts and principles constitute potential barrier to insurance market 
participation. This suggests that financial educational policy intervention 
programmes seeking to ensure participation in micro-insurance are likely to have 
expected impact when directed to target the informal market business operators in 
Ghana.  
The number of dependents (Depend) has a coefficient of -0.060. This shows a 
negative association with amount willing to pay. So, as the number of dependents 
increases, amount willing to pay for micro-insurance decreases by all things being 
equal. This result validates that of Babatunde et al. (2012) and Kwadzo et al. 
(2013). Again, the coefficient of savings is given as 0.001 and statistically 
significant at 10%. Thus, an increase in savings by GH¢1.00 leads to increase in 
the amount willing to pay for micro-insurance by 0.10%. This finding confirms 
the result of Hulme et al. (2009) in the sense that access to savings can help the 
poor manage vulnerabilities through accumulated savings. 
The coefficient of trust variable is given as -0.324; this indicates that trust and/or 
confidence in micro-insurance as a guarantee for future business safety during 
shock decreases the amount willing to pay for micro-insurance  all things being 
equal. This finding confirms the result of Chowdhury et al. (2007) and Yusuf et 
al. (2009).  This study has found out that Yearly, half yearly, quarterly and 
monthly premium payment modes have positive and significant effects on amount 
willing to pay for micro-insurance given their coefficients as 0.471, 0.344, 0.694 
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and 0.444 respectively. Thus respondents in the yearly premium paying mode 
category are willing to pay more compared with their counterparts in daily 
category; also respondents in the half yearly, quarterly and monthly are willing to 
pay  more  for micro-insurance compared with respondents in the daily premium 
payment mode category. This finding confirms that of Akotey et al. (2011).  
Moreover, the coefficient of income is given as 0.019, which is positive and 
statistically significant at 10%. This indicates that, an increase in income by 
GH¢1.00 increases the amount willing to pay for micro-insurance by1.9% more 
on the average, all things being equal.  This finding is similar to that obtained by 
Dror et al. (2006).  
Finally, Table 2 shows the diagnostic tests for the estimation exercise. These are 
captured in the coefficients of rho (ρ), sigma (  and lambda (λ) or ‘selection 
hazard’. They are -0.708, 0.845 and -0.599, respectively, and they are all 
significant. Given the fact that rho (ρ), which is the correlation coefficient of ε 
and μ in equations (5) and (6) is significant; notice that ρ = λ. In fact, (ρ) 
determines whether or not selection bias exists; once (ρ) is significantly different 
from zero, it can then be concluded that selection bias existed in the sample but it 
has been corrected. 
      
 
 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
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The study sought to examine the effect of financial literacy on willingness to pay 
for micro-insurance among the informal commercial market business operators. 
Data was elicited from 612 market operators drawn from selected urban market 
centers in Ghana. Heckman’s two-step estimation technique was employed to 
cater for the problem of sample selection bias. From the findings the conclusions 
of the study are that: Financial literacy has a positive effect on the amount 
informal commercial market business operators are willing to pay for micro-
insurance in Ghana. Respondents in single, married and divorced categories have 
a higher willingness to pay for micro-insurance. Also number of dependents, 
savings and trust significantly explain willingness to pay for micro-insurance. 
Again premium payment flexibility increases willingness to pay for micro-
insurance. Finally income increases the amount willing to pay for micro-insurance 
scheme among informal market business operators in Ghana. 
The study recommends that providers of micro-insurance services should reach 
out by providing their targeted clientele financial education intervention 
programmes to improve upon their financial knowledge and increase participation 
in micro-insurance scheme. Also micro-insurance providers should ensure 
flexibility in micro-insurance premium payment to ensure participation of market 
operators in their schemes. Moreover, insurance providers should invest in 
building reputation by improving quality service delivery to boost confidence of 
the potential insuring public to subscribe to micro-insurance. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Table A: Definition and measurement of variables 
Variable Measurement 
Sex Sex of a respondent. A female dummy. 
Age Number of years of the respondent. 
Mari_Status Current Marital status of the respondent 
Market Levy Amount paid per month as market 
occupancy levy in cedis. 
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Fin_Lit Respondent’s level of financial 
knowledge. An index measure. 
Depend Number of dependents under the care 
of the respondent. 
Years_Biz A measure of number of years in the 
commercial market business.  
Savings The amount of savings balance owned 
by the respondent in cedis. 
Trust A dummy variable. A measure of a 
respondent’s trust and confidence in 
micro-insurance contract. 
Premium A categorical variable. A measure of 
Mode of premium payment. 
Creditaccess A dummy variable. A measure of access 
to credit facility by a respondent. 
Income Monthly average income of a 
respondent in cedis. 
AmtWilling Natural log of amount willing to pay 
for micro-insurance. 
WillPart Willingness to participate in micro-
insurance. Binary response variable    
(1/0) 
Riskexper A measure of the respondent’s risk 
experience in business 
Peer A measure of Peer influence 
 
                     
Appendix B
 
Formula and determination of Sample size 
SS   =    
Where;   SS = required sample size 
               = estimated confidence level 
                 = estimated prevalence of insurance participation 
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             = the margin of error 
       SS =    
                SS =    
                 SS =    
SS = 245.8624 246. Thus, the primary sample size was 246. To correct for 
differences in design, for cluster sample, in this survey, this primary sample size 
was multiplied by the design effect (D). Generally, researchers assume the design 
effect to be 2 for survey involving cluster sampling. Thus, SS x D = 246 x 2 = 
492.  The sample size was further increased by 5% to cater for contingencies 
emanating from non-response and/or possible recording error: 
SS+5% = 492x1.05 = 516.60   517. An arbitrary 100 questionnaires were added 
thus, bringing the sample size to 617. To determine the number of observations to 
be sampled from each zone, the sample size was spread over the 3 zones from 
which the survey was conducted. Thus, 617 3 = 205.66   206. So, 206 
questionnaires were sent to each zone, which were administered in the selected 
market centers.  Thus, total questionnaires sent to the field were 618, and out of 
this, 6 respondents decline to be part of the interview. Therefore the total sample 
size used for the study was 612. 
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